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This article reports research on bureaucrat behaviour. Where discretion exists, do primary 
associations such as religious, gender or racial identity guide behaviour or are these 
associations superseded by secondary learned professional or technocratic attachments? 
Using the theoretical lens of representative bureaucracy and Q methodology to investigate 
bureaucrat role perceptions, two distinct bureaucrat typologies are identified in Belfast. The 
evidence demonstrates that an elite level bureaucrat may actively represent his or her own 
professional interests or alternatively, may seek out and actively represent the interests of 
the political elite as a collective. The findings have implications for representative 
bureaucracy research as it is demonstrated that an elite level bureaucrat may actively 
represent something other than a primary identity. This contribution also provides a useful 
insight into everyday life within a bureau of a successful power-sharing system of 
governance. 
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Points for Practitioners 
 
Politicians and bureaucrats from Northern Ireland are perpetually being invited to ‘teach the 
lessons’ of their power-sharing experience. This article highlights the importance of the elite 
level bureaucrat in sustaining power-sharing regimes and provides an empirical basis for 






As acknowledged by Stanfield (1996: 15), we know ‘virtually nothing’ about how ethnically 
differing peoples manage to coexist peacefully. Wake-Carroll and Carroll (2000:120) 
reiterate Stanfield’s assertion reminding us that ‘we need to know a great deal more about 
the ways in which diverse ethnic communities are sometimes able to coexist in relative 
harmony’. Further, in one of the seminal contributions to conflict management literature of 
the previous decade, Varshney (2002:6) reinforces this belief, maintaining that ‘until we 
study ethnic peace, we will not be able to have a good theory of ethnic conflict’. With the 
intention of expanding scholarly understanding of ethnic peace, this research draws on 
public administration theory to help us understand the role of the elite level bureaucrat in 
sustaining power-sharing mechanisms of conflict management.  
A multitude of studies contribute to our understanding of how conflict management 
institutions should be designed. These institutions usually emerge from either power-
sharing or power-dividing schools of thought. However less is known about how bureaucrats 
operate within these institutional designs. Accepting that the traditional Wilsonian politics -
public administration dichotomy does not exist, elite level bureaucrats must surely influence 
the success of conflict management regimes. This case study examines their role 
perceptions, focusing particularly on their representation perceptions within the power-
sharing society. When a decision is being taken, who or what do elite level bureaucrats 
represent? As it is accepted that identification guides behaviour in instances of bureaucrat 
discretion, we need to understand if secondary learned attachments can supersede the 
primary identities of elite level bureaucrats. Hindera (1993) defines two types of association: 
primary associations as those into which we are born such as gender, race, ethnicity etc, 
while secondary associations on the other hand are those which we generate, or socially 
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construct – attachment to an organisation or football club for example. The lens of 
representative bureaucracy is used to determine these representation perceptions.  
 
Introduction to the case study 
Until 1997, Belfast returned a majority unionist Council, which was found to represent only 
one community and even at that, Bollens (2000: 230) finds the interests of this community 
to have been poorly served with local politicians being more interested in the Anglo-Irish 
agreement than in the everyday lives of their constituents. In 1997, the electoral results left 
non-aligned Alliance holding the balance of power. The politicians were forced to cooperate 
in order for the Council to continue to function. Since 1997, power-sharing, relying on 
informal norms and practices, has governed the functioning of the City Council.  
Bollens’ (2000) pre power-sharing research, conducted in 1994, suggests that policy 
making in Belfast was neutral or colourlessi. Bureaucrats, he finds, employed technical 
rational criteria in the allocation of resources, distancing themselves from the issues of 
ethnic identity, power inequalities and political exclusion. While bureaucrats were involved 
in conflict management, they were planning for two cities, two communities and were not 
involved in the conflict management-conflict resolution process. This neutral strategy relies 
on technical rational data in resource allocation, distancing itself from issues of ethnic 
identity, power inequalities and political exclusion. As citizens are treated as individuals and 
not as being from a particular community, this gives rise to the term colour-blind. However, 
despite being ignored in government plans and blueprints, sectarianism was nonetheless 
acknowledged in policy formulation – ‘it was as if we were carrying out a plan for two cities 
that happened to overlap each other’; what Bollens terms ‘plural planning’ (Bollens, 2000: 
233). While addressing the two colours of the city, blue and green, no effort was made to 
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‘disturb the volatile territoriality of the city’ (ibid: 233). Before power-sharing, sectarianism 
was ‘accepted as a characteristic of the urban setting’ (ibid: 233). The bureaucratic elite did 
not perceive it to be their role to challenge this status quo. The changing nature of the wider 
public administration in Northern Ireland is analysed from devolution to direct rule by Birrell 
(1978) and direct rule back to devolution by Carmichael and Osborne  (2003) while Knox and 
Carmichael, (2005, 2006) investigate reform efforts within the Northern Ireland civil service. 
The reason for situating the study within Belfast is presented in the next section. 
 The next part of this article draws on existing representative bureaucracy scholarship 
identifying the two opposing schools of thought which suggest that a bureaucrat may 
actively represent his or her primary or secondary identity. The following paragraphs 
provide a rationale for investigating the possibility of a professional association emerging. 
This is followed by the methods section, together with a short note on the importance of 
role perceptions in determining policy proposals. The findings are then introduced before 
returning to the central hypothesis.  
 
Representative bureaucracy 
Kingsley’s (1944) representative bureaucracy put forward that it did not matter whether a 
politician or elite level bureaucrat made a decision, as within the British civil service, both 
parties shared similar beliefs, experiences and values. As such, a decision by a bureaucrat 
would mirror that of the politician, given paralleled access to information. The theory was 
not uncontentious at the time as bureaucrats were supposed to dispose, not propose. The 
essence of Kingsley’s argument was that the public administration would always represent 
the interests of its composite class – the middle class. The theory was significantly advanced 
by Van Riper (1958:552) where he supposed that decisions made by the bureaucracy 
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mirrored the preferences, ‘ethos and attitudes’ of the society which they governed. Mosher 
(1968: 12) further developed the theory, differentiating between “that which the 
bureaucracy is” and “that which the bureaucracy does”. According to Mosher, passive 
representativeness concerns the origin of individuals and the degree to which, collectively, 
they mirror society, while in active representation an individual is expected to press for the 
interests of those he or she represents (Hindera, 1993: 417). Hannah Pitkin (1967) describes 
this as the difference between that which the bureaucrat ‘is’ (passive) and that which the 
bureaucrat ‘does’ (active). In other words, passive representation would simply concern 
itself with the number of Turkmen, Kurds and Arabs within the Kirkuk bureaucracy relative 
to the population of the city. Active representation on the other hand concerns itself with 
the actions of each group within the bureaucracy, attempting to determine if or when 
representation within the administration equates with the flow of benefits to that particular 
group.  
Some studies have shown that blacks and women portray evidence of active 
representation as minorities within a bureaucracy – i.e. that women would support the 
interests of women within the bureaucracy and members of the black community similarly 
advocate the interests of the wider black population (Mansbridge, 1999; Keiser et al, 2002; 
Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006). By extension, within a contested society one would 
expect that, in the case of Belfast, Catholics would represent Catholic interests and 
Protestants would represent Protestant interests. However another body of research finds 
incorporating qualified professionals into a bureaucracy also incorporates their professional 
values into the bureaucracy (March and Olsen, 1995). Organisations depersonalise 
relationships which allows for a technocratic mentality to develop (Ferguson, 1984; Radaelli 
and O’Connor, 2009). This incorporation of professional values into the bureaucracy will 
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lead the bureaucracy to develop its own set of values and norms which, through 
socialisation, could potentially supersede traditional norms. Rehfuss (1986: 459) not only 
found that role and representation perceptions of women and minorities differed little from 
their white male counterparts within the administration, but that they appeared to share a 
‘management ideology’. Thus instead of Catholics representing Catholic interests and 
Protestants representing Protestant interests, we would expect to find both Catholic and 
Protestant bureaucratic elites to represent common professional, technocratic interests; 
likewise for the republicans, nationalists, loyalists and unionistsii. Meier and O’Toole (2006) 
and Keiser et al (2002) ascertain that a critical mass is required for the formulation of an 
actively representative bureaucracy. Thus a department would require numerical sufficiency 
of a particular ethnicity (or set of values) for benefits to begin to flow to that ethnicity, (or to 
those in society holding those values). Put succinctly by Keiser et al (2002: 557): 
“If professionals who see advocacy for a particular group as their role dominate a 
bureaucracy, we should expect bureaucratic outputs to be distributed to benefit that 
group.” 
 
Therefore, the argument goes, if Catholics are numerically sufficient within the Belfast 
bureaucracy, benefits should correspondingly flow to that group. While Meier and 
Nicholson-Crotty (2006) are able to show that an increase in female police officers 
corresponds with an increase in instances of rape actually reported to the police, is this 
because female police officers take forward the cases of female victims, or as Lim (2006) 
would suggest, because female norms and values have been adopted by those males 
working closely with their female counterparts, thereby changing the norms of the 
organisation? If the latter is the case, through socialisation with women men can now 
represent the interests of women, the norms of the bureaucracy are now more 
representative of those in society at large. As indicated by Rehfuss (1986) above, one 
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therefore does not have to ‘passively represent’ to ‘actively represent’. Kennedy (2008) 
strengthens this argument referring to those providing services to the mentally and 
physically disabled. Within an ethno-politically divided city, do the bureaucratic elite possess 
these secondary, learned/socially constructed associations or do they attach themselves to 
a primary, ethnic, personal identity? As Reissman (1949: 305) puts forward, the formal 
structure, interpersonal relationships and the surrounding social milieu all contribute to the 
‘social role the bureaucrat fills’. A further study which assists in generating expectations 
within the contested society is that of Grissom et al (2009) where they found ‘situation’ to 
matter. They found blacks in Southern American states to be more likely to actively 
represent blacks in society than blacks in Northern American states. This would lead us to 
expect that in ethno-politically contested environments, or societies new to power-sharing 
forms of governance, bureaucrats would be more likely to maintain a primary identity. The 
emerging power-sharing society is therefore a most useful case selection as it is most 
conducive to proving the hypothesis wrong (ie. that a secondary learned attachment cannot 
supersede a primary attachment). Further, everyday life remains divided in Belfast where 
two thirds of Belfast’s population continue to live in areas where over 81% of residents are 
of the same religion (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). Belfast therefore is an example of what 
Eckstein (1975: 118) would have called a crucial case of the most likely case variety: if 
passive representation on behalf of a religious identity is likely to translate into active 
representation on behalf of a religious identity, it is most likely to do so in Belfast.  
 
Why a professional attachment?  
Active representation most definitely exists within all bureaucracies; however before 
international organisations consider administrative reform strategies, it is necessary to 
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understand precisely what values bureaucratic elites actively represent. In an attempt to 
avert bureaucrats from representing their primary ethno-national identities, Mengistu and 
Vogel (2006) submit that a national Ethiopian identity could potentially supersede primary 
tribal identities. In a country such as Ethiopia, where over eighty different ethnicities inhabit 
the state, obtaining a critical mass of each tribal group so that benefits would flow to each 
group would be impractical. A national Ethiopian identity, they submit, would supersede 
tribal identities, thereby ensuring that ethnic groups are not simply representing their tribal 
positions within the bureaucracy. However, in ethnically contested societies, different 
ethnicities or communities attribute different importance to the concept of state 
nationality. In some cases the legitimacy of the state is even contested. Unlike nation states 
where identification with the nation and the state usually exist simultaneously as a primary 
identity, identification with the governing state within the contested society is often in a 
secondary, or learned, capacity. Since the traditionally disadvantaged ethnic communities 
are not prone to the acceptance of state authority, such allegiances would be difficult to 
form as they would be in direct contrast to their primary ‘national’ 
(ethnic/community/tribal) identities. Emerging from these studies of representative 
bureaucracy this paper tests the following hypothesis: A secondary attachment can 
supersede a primary attachment among elite level bureaucrats within an emerging power-
sharing society.  
 
A note on role perceptions and methods 
Failure to account for bureaucrat norms and values can lead to the failure of administrative 
reform which in turn influences the success of power-sharing regimes (O’Connor, 2012). In 
Lebanon, a significant proportion of responsibility for the failure of bureaucratic reform is 
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placed on the failure of The Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform 
(OMSAR) to work with the existing indigenous public administration, as opposed to working 
against it (El-Zein and Sims, 2004). Despite the good intentions of OMSAR, its disregard for 
the existing individual bureaucratic norms and values, contributed to the projects failure. 
Without an understanding of bureaucrat role perceptions, norms and values any structural 
change will be manipulated by the unknown human condition, generating unintended 
consequences. Exploring how the bureaucratic elite behave within power-sharing societies 
can inform our expectations of bureaucratic behaviour and hence demonstrate how 
structural change will be exploited by one of the most influential actors within the 
governance process. Do bureaucrats within a power-sharing environment actually represent 
their personal community backgrounds or have they, through education, time, socialisation 
or other explanatory variables developed a professional attachment which supersedes their 
ethnic identities? Following Selden et al’s (1999) study, bureaucrats could (theoretically) be 
entirely responsive to the political level akin to Wilsonian doctrines of public administration. 
Alternatively, bureaucrats could possess neutrality Weberian-style values. These neutrality 
attributes differ markedly from those responsive to the political level – bureaucrats with 
neutrality values give prominence to legislation and treaties, not the political policies of the 
minister, they maintain a neutral position on potentially divisive decisions and find that they 
represent the integrity of the organisation as opposed to serving the minister. Together with 
these role interpretations it is also important to understand bureaucrat’s perceptions of 
equity and efficiency and their position on the traditional right/left divide (Selden et al, 
1999).  
The image of an ‘internally coherent self’ has been widely rejected and replaced by a 
conception of individuals as ‘collections of roles and identities that may even be loosely 
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coupled’ (Egeberg, 1999: 458). ‘The crucial question is: Which role or identity becomes 
evoked in a particular decision situation? Roles, identities and situations can all be 
ambiguous’ (March 1994: 61, Egeberg, 1999: 459). This paves the way for the generation of 
bureaucrat typologies or as Stephenson (1935) would have termed them: clusters of 
subjectivity. The role perceptions of the bureaucrat have been deemed to be of importance 
in determining the policy-making processes (Selden et al, 1999; Brewer et al 2000; 
O’Connor, 2014). It is acknowledged that bureaucrats within the contested society possess 
multiple attachments and may simultaneously possess a multitude of identities that may 
sometimes even directly conflict with each other. A methodology that allows for a multitude 
of preferences to be simultaneously explored is therefore required. Q methodology is 
particularly adept at measuring competing preferences simultaneously. For a concise and 
very readable introduction to Q see Van Exel and De Graff (2005) or Brown (1980). 
The concourse for this research originated from a review of the bureaucrat 
behaviour literature. Focusing on concepts such as legitimacy, representation, role 
perception, identity, scope of governance and motivation, statements representing each of 
the theoretically existent characteristics underlined above were identifiediii. These in turn 
were whittled down to 46 statements in much the same way as would be done when 
preparing a questionnaire.  
  As in Q who the interviewees are is more important than the quantity of interviews; 
a list was compiled of all directors, all heads of department and some managers, in what 
were identified as areas ‘key’ to conflict management (areas incorporating a potentially 
contentious aspect and also areas where the Council had the primary responsibility for 
service provision). Of these forty-seven, twenty-five were chosen for interview. Twenty of 
these agreed to partake in the study (a response rate of 80%).  To reiterate, interviews were 
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targeted on the basis of position within the public administration – not perceived 
nationality, gender, race or creed. As it transpired, eight Catholics, seven Protestants, and 
five indicating neither background were interviewed. However, given that we are looking at 
a contested city, it is important to establish the representativeness of the sample. Therefore 
the religious backgrounds of all forty seven top decision makers within Belfast City Council 
were obtained. Where N=47 (entire bureaucratic elite), the ratio of Catholics to Protestants 
is 1:1.14. In this N=20 sample the ratio of Catholics to Protestants is 1:1.04. Thus in terms of 
religion, our sample is as representative of the target population as can be expected.  
 
The Findings  
In this Q study, interviewees were required to sort opinion statements in a quasi-normal 
distribution ranging from +3 to -3. The interviewee Q-sorts (responses) were entered into 
the software: PQ method (Schmolck), subject to Principal Component Analysis where the 
emerging matrix was then rotated using Varimax criteria, revealing two similar bureaucrat 
factors or typologies. Each typology represents a conceptual template originating from 
where each respondent categorised the statements. Factors or typologies are simply 
interviewees who were found to share similar beliefs about a given subject. The diversity of 
the two typologies is represented in table one below. Table two explains how each 
respondent contributes to the definition/make-up of each of the typologies (or how they 
come into being), while table three then identifies the characteristics of each of our two 
factors. 
_______________ 
Insert tables 1, 2 and 3 about here 
_____________ 
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Each typology is presented below in turn. Throughout the findings section, reference is 
made to various statements presented in table three (statement number is indicated in 
brackets), together with evidence from the interviews (Interviewee number is identified as 
‘Interview X’). While both typologies share many views, let us first consider what 
differentiates them. 
 
Factor One: Policy makers and advocators 
This first typology has a good working relationship with the political actors within the city. 
While those weighing on this factor do not substitute their own political values with those of 
the political elite (42), they perceive their actions to be legitimate as the political level agree 
with their decisions and recommendations (22, 26). This factor however does not believe 
that resources should be allocated according to the wishes of the political level regardless of 
their opinions (7). Their role is not simply to advise the Minister (10) but to actively pursue 
positions that they perceive are the interests of the entire urban public (11). When 
differences do emerge, they maintain their expert beliefs for as long as politically possible 
(40). While they do attribute importance to the neutrality of the bureaucracy, (28) neutrality 
is interpreted to mean that all urban citizens are represented by the administration. This 
factor does not follow the rules of the administration under all circumstances (8). They are 
not overtly technocratic, accounting for political factors when making decisions (19). 
Administrators should not be neutral, but prioritise good management and social equity 
(17). They take the initiative in proposing policies, mobilising support for them and question 
policies that may run counter to the general interest of the urban population (36). The views 
of think tanks and international organisations such as the OECD and EU are held in high 
regard by this factor (41). They actively advocate in favour of policy positions that they 
13 
perceive represent the needs of the entire urban public (11), and actively advocate in favour 
of policy positions that address the needs of minority citizens (3). Conflict management is a 
function for this factor – where differences exist, they see it as their role to mediate and 
determine a course of action that satisfies everyone (14). 
 This factor is not overly attached to a particular policy area (44), but instead 
represents a broader vision for the city. Equity commitments trump policy specific 
commitments among those weighing on this factor (1, 31), particularly as they operate 
within a contested city (6). Equity between ethnic groups however should not be a 
determinant in resource allocation – just because one community is given a resource, this 
should not be a reason to give the other community the resource (20). This factor also 
possesses a concurrent commitment to efficiency (21, 2).   
The legitimacy of their actions is derived from their responsibility to attain an 
equitable, fair and prosperous society – not the law, political direction, or their expert 
beliefs. As indicated by the positioning of statements 38, 33, 18, 32, this factor believes in 
the public provision of state services and are open and committed to public sector reform. 
This factor disagrees most strongly with the idea of representing one’s community (primary 
identity) within the bureaucracy (24, 30, 35, 39, 43, 45, 46). A further noteworthy finding is 
the irrelevance the factor attributes to recruitment statements (2, 15). This factor embodies 
many of the characteristics put forward by Waldo (1971) and Groeneveld and Van de Walle 
(2010). They could be categorised as ‘Image IV’ of Aberback et al’s (1981) theoretical view of 
the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in that responsibility for formulating 
policy, brokering interests and articulating interests is shared by politicians and bureaucrats. 
The following quotations from the follow-on discussions give a further insight into the 
motivations, norms and values of this factor: 
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‘It is only when we bring things to the attention of the political level that they have 
influence’ (Interview 1) 
‘There is an incapacity at the political level to deal with the more technical stuff’ (Interview 
2) 
‘I only present an options paper when cuts are to be political’ (Interview 4) 
‘My area is quite technical…the political level rubber stamp my decisions’ (Interview 5) 
‘I view my role as a coordinator…I put things in a framework in which they can agree’ 
(Interview 9) 
‘My role is to steer them [political level] in the right way’ (Interview 12) 
‘I have a broader view for the city, as opposed to a political view’ (Interview 15) 
‘My role is to manage the decision-making process’  (Interview 17) 
‘You have to do your homework before Council meetings…I build a relationship with 
Councillors so they may have confidence in me’ (Interview 19) 
 
Those aligning themselves along this factor come from both communities in Northern 
Ireland. Three were from the Protestant community, while five had a Catholic community 
background. Three identified with neither community. Two felt British, four Irish and five 
Northern Irish. Five respondents had a degree and six held a Masters or higher qualification. 
Four were fairly attached to their religion; four were not attached, while a further three 
described themselves as not at all attached. 
 
Factor Two: Policy designers and implementers 
Those aligning with factor two see themselves as representing government and see their 
role as to carry out the wishes of the urban government. Overall they are a more 
technocratic factor and are inclined to retreat to the evidence in order to persuade the 
political level to cooperate. Unlike factor one, when there is a conflict of interest between 
their personal, expert beliefs and those of the political level, they are more inclined to 
follow those of the political level (25). They are also the most likely factor to suppress their 
own values in favour of those of the political level (42). Similar to factor one however, they 
are rarely pressurised by elected officials to alter their expert recommendations or decisions 
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(26). They see their role as to carry out the wishes of urban government (5, 12). While this 
factor is highly responsive to the political level, they do not simply provide advice to the 
political level (10). They aim for government that works better and costs less (21). They are 
against private sector provision of state services (8, 18), but are also less enthusiastic about 
public sector reform (38) and less concerned with directly representing the interests of 
citizens than factor one (33). They are also attached to professional norms and values (11, 
36, 40), however this factor possess simultaneous attachments to the political level.  
While factor one actively pursue broader societal objectives, factor two are more 
technocratic. They attribute significant importance to their policy area (44). They tend to 
prioritise the goal of efficiency, providing technically feasible and efficient solutions to the 
political level (27). This is not to mean that they allocate resources according to technical 
criteria only (4). Political factors also need to be considered when taking decisions and 
making recommendations (19). While they disagree with affirmative action (2, 15), this 
factor are aware of the contested nature of the environment in which they work and like 
factor one involve themselves in conflict management, mediating between political 
differences (14). Unlike factor one, factor two believe that as they operate within a 
contested city, resources should balance technical and demographic criteria (20). Efficiency 
is not always a priority (1). In terms of equity, they do not disproportionately represent 
minority groups (3). Neutrality is highly regarded by this factor (28). Unlike factor one, 
neutrality is seen more traditionally, being grounded in the law (13) and technocracy (2).  
Together with factor one, factor two possess a strong commitment to public service. They 
are however more rule bound; viewing public service in a supporting capacity to the political 
level. Factor two similarly rejects any possibility of actively representing their personal 
communities; their primary concern being to develop an efficient administration so as to be 
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responsive to the wishes of the urban government (2, 21, 12, 5, 25). However, while they 
are responsive to the political level, they also expect the political level to be responsive to 
them (7, 9, 40).  
Factor two, while incorporating a commitment to professional ideas, are found to 
agree with a greater number of ‘political responsive’ and ‘neutrality’ statements. While not 
an exact fit, they are therefore closer to Aberback et al’s (1981) ‘Image III’ of the 
relationship between the political and bureaucratic level – while they are active in 
implementing and formulating policy, they do try to seek out the ideas of the political level. 
Whilst taking into account the equity concerns of a contested city, this factor’s values lean 
more towards efficiency concerns. In sum, this factor is less likely to actively represent 
broader societal goals, and is more interested in actively developing a more efficient 
administration to carry out the wishes of the urban government. They are however 
significant stakeholders in the policy design process and significantly influence the outcome 
of public policy. Similar to factor one they can be described as ‘co-producers’, however they 
are more likely to seek out and represent the policy goals of the political level rather than 
seeking to represent what they perceive to be broader societal goals. The following quotes 
from the informal interview support these findings:  
‘I meet with the political level to determine what their priorities are or knowing where they 
are at…I need to know what tactic to deploy’ (Interview 20) 
‘When Councillors disagree I retreat to the evidence’ (Interview 18) 
‘Generally I like to give a recommendation to Councillors, if there are a number of options I 
will discuss it with individual Councillors beforehand’ (Interview 16) 
‘I keep the debate technical’ (Interview 14)  
‘Our role is to inform, not to take decisions’ (Interview 7)  
‘My role is to make sure they take a fully informed decision. ...the primary value of the 
administration is neutrality’ (Interview 8) 
‘There is always a technical basis for decisions’ (Interview 14) 
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Four Protestants, two Catholics and two identifying with neither community weighed 
significantly on this factor. Four possessed a British identity, one an Irish identity and three 
possessed a Northern Irish identity. One held a degree while seven had a Master’s degree or 
higher. Again four were fairly attached to their religion, while four described themselves as 
‘not at all attached’. As with factor one, typology alignment does not correlate with primary 
identity. 
Returning to the hypothesis  
As identified in table one, both Belfast factors share many beliefs and perceptions. Factor 
one however are motivated by their own personal goals and objectives, grounded in their 
technocratic expertise or broader social objectives. Factor two, while still actively involved 
in the policy-making process, try and ascertain and implement the goals of the political elite. 
While two distinguishable typologies do emerge, a number of core governance beliefs were 
held by all respondents. We see that both factors agree with the principle that equity is 
more important than efficiency (1, 6), however as outlined above, there is a difference in 
how equity is interpreted. Both factors have a strong commitment to good governance (21). 
They are not willing to follow the rules of the bureaucracy under all circumstances (8, 37); 
nor do they perceive their role as simply to provide input with their expertise or to provide 
advice (10).  Both factors see themselves as co-producers within the policy process, 
providing technically feasible and efficient solutions (27). Both factors also involve 
themselves in conflict management decisions, and consider it their function to mediate 
between differing political viewpoints (14). Neutrality and impartiality are of paramount 
importance (27), but both factors differ on how these concepts are interpreted (17). The 
findings therefore demonstrate that a secondary learned attachment can supersede a 
primary identity within a contested society. In summary, while both factors are equally 
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active in the management of conflict, factor two are more likely to ascertain and pursue the 
goals of the political elite as a collective, while factor one are more likely to pursue what 
they themselves perceive to be the wishes of society. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The article has explored the attitudes and role perceptions dominating the politico-
administrative axis for ‘without knowledge of the values held by the bureaucracy, it is futile 
to attempt any full determination of the degree of political control’ (Meier and O’Toole, 
2006:29). It is this politico-administrative axis that most concerns the investigation into how 
conflict is regulated. As power-sharing emerges, the political-administration dichotomy is 
the primary determinant in the policy-making process. The typologies give an insight into 
this dynamic process.  
The research has uncovered a number of important findings. First and foremost 
active representation on behalf of a secondary attachment can emerge within a contested 
society governed by power-sharing. Drawing on Meier and O’Toole’s (2006) research it is 
accepted that values affect behaviour. Akin to Meier and O’Toole (2006:93), the article finds 
that certain groups within the ‘bureaucracy [are] acting consistently with [their] own values 
rather than being directed by electoral institutions’. However, contrary to findings by 
Bradbury and Kellough (2007) and Wilkins (2006) their own values are not necessarily their 
primary identities. While indeed our factors are found to be involved in active 
representation, this active representation is based on a secondary learned attachment. 
Keiser’s (1999:87) study of street-level bureaucrats found that ‘professional norms play a 
large role in directing the ways that street-level bureaucrats use their discretion’. Similarly, 
at the elite level, active representation is found to exist on behalf of a secondary learned 
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attachment. Callahan and Olshfski (2006) found that in the absence of a strong state 
narrative, latent (personal) narratives come to the fore and in turn guide behaviour. By its 
design, Q method categorises the competing preferences of bureaucrats. Representing a 
personal community is not even demonstrated as a latent narrative among our sample. 
While Q methodology measures the range of views on a topic, not the extent to which they 
are ascribed, the findings demonstrate that it is possible for elite level bureaucrats to be 
motivated by secondary learned attachments. The findings cannot tell us however the 
extent to which these factors are ascribed to among the bureaucratic elite. Survey research 
based on these results would be able to answer such a question. Further, the article does 
not examine the extent to which epistemic communities have emerged in Belfast. While 
many bureaucrats perceive themselves as ‘experts’ in their policy areas, there is no evidence 
to suggest that this expertise causes them to share an identity. Indeed, institutional or other 
environmental reasons could influence bureaucrat preferences.  
  While previous studies have identified that the bureaucratic elite play a significant 
role in regulating conflict management mechanisms (O’Connor, 2012), this study has 
demonstrated the range of narratives that guide the bureaucrat in Belfast in his or her 
everyday life within the bureau. Thus it can be said that active representation definitely 
exists within the emerging power-sharing society but that which is actively represented 
varies between bureaucrats. It is also clear that bureaucrats weighing on similar factors do 
not possess similar nationalities. While it has been suggested in the literature that a 
common ‘national’ identity could supersede these tribal affiliations, it is suggested that in an 
environment where demand is high and resources are limited, instances where both the 
national and the ethnic identity could collide would be frequent. Following Meier and 
O’Toole (2006) and Keiser et al (2002), under such circumstances, the bureaucrat would 
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then be expected to revert to his/her primary tribal identity. It is put forward that 
attachments along professional lines should be more sustainable than those built along the 
dubious notion of nationality. While a mutual national and tribal identity would be difficult, 
attachment to regulatory reform principles or to improving social cohesion or to poverty 
alleviation should not directly conflict with a primary ethno-national attachment. This study 
has demonstrated that it is not unrealistic to expect such attachments, even in the 
environment where they are least likely. 
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Table 1: Correlation of the Factors 
 F1 F2 
1 1.0000 0.7236 




Table 2: The relationship between Belfast interviewees and factors 
This table describes how closely each interviewee (p) weighs on each factor For example; 
interviewee no. 2 is .69 in factor 1 and .29 in factor 2. The X denotes that the respondent’s 
answers contributed to the make-up of that particular factors general perception. 
 
P                       1             2 
  1            0.4410X   0.3984  
   2            0.6900X   0.2930  
   3           0.3180    0.5756X 
   4            0.8255X   0.2930  
   5            0.6809X   0.3334  
   6            0.7835X   0.2523  
   7           0.4800    0.5878X 
   8           0.4110    0.7521X 
   9            0.6292X   0.4703  
  10          0.1563    0.7290X 
  12           0.6994X   0.2474  
  13           0.6736X   0.4321  
  14          0.5054    0.5914X 
  15           0.7865X   0.1306  
  16          0.4047    0.5140X 
  17           0.5679X   0.4553  
  18          0.4586    0.6509X 
  19           0.7391X   0.3806  




Table 3: Factor Arrays  
In the table below, the relationship between each factor (or group of individuals) and each 
statement is identified. In other words, the table identifies where each collective of 
individuals placed the Q statements. (eg. statement one would have been placed in the -1, 
mildly disagree, category by interviewees in factors 1 and 2)  
 
                            Factor Arrays Belfast 
Factor 
number 
No. Classification  Statement                                                   F1    F2 
1 Efficiency If a government employee is forced to choose 
between the most efficient policy and the most 
equitable policy, the most efficient alternative 
should be chosen 
-1    -1 
2 Efficiency Bureaucracies should be staffed by professionally 
trained, technically competent individuals. The 
most qualified person should always get the job    
0      2 
3 Equity I recommend or actively advocate in favour of 
policy positions that address the needs and 
concerns of minority citizens 
1     -1 
4 Efficiency I advocate the allocation of resources according to 
technical criteria only – those who need the 
service should get it 
0     -1 
5 Political My role is to carry out the wishes of urban 
government 
1      3 
6 Equity Given the cultural diversity within my city, equity 
and fairness between various ethnicities is more 
important than efficiency 
1      0 
7 Political Resources should be allocated according to the 
wishes of the political elite, regardless of my 
opinions 
-1      0 
8 Neutral My role is to follow the rules of the bureaucracy at 
all times no matter what the circumstances        
-2     -1 
9 Political I value the views of the urban political elite, and 
those positively influence my personal opinions 
0      -1 
10 Political My role is to serve as an expert within my policy 
area, serving ONLY to provide advice to my 
Minister/Council Committee 
-1     -1 
11 Professional I recommend or actively advocate in favour of 
policy positions that I perceive represent the 
needs and interests of the entire urban public 
3      2 
12 Political In my daily work I represent the elected 
government of the city 
1      3 
13 Neutral My decisions are legitimate as I follow procedures 
established by law and/or secondary legislation 
0      3 
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14 Professional My role is to mediate conflicting interests and find 
a course of action that satisfies everyone. 
2      2 
15 Equity  Given the cultural diversity of my city, a 
prerequisite for good governance would be 
recruitment from all sectors of the community, 
even if this means that the best person does not 
always get the job. On the job training can correct 
this imbalance. 
0     -2 
16 Personal I actively encourage procedures that give my 
community the greater access to the public 
services that the deserve 
-2     -3 
17 Professional Administrators are not neutral. They should be 
committed to good management and social equity 
as values  




I believe that by putting the interests of business 
first, benefits will flow to citizens 
-1     -2 
19 Neutral In contemporary social and economic affairs it is 
essential that technical considerations be given 
more weight than political factors 
-1     -1 
20 Equity Given that I operate within a contested city, 
resource allocation should balance technical 
criteria (those who need it get it) and demographic 
criteria (if one community gets a resource, the 
other should get it too – regardless of necessity) 
-1      1 
21 Efficiency Public employees should aim for governance that 
works better and costs less 
3       2 
22 Political My decisions are legitimate as I only follow the 
decisions of the political level 
1       0 
23 Neutral In my daily work I represent my department and 
the wider civil service  
1       1 
24 Personal In my daily work I value the views of community 
interest groups with whom I share a personal 
political affinity  
-2     -2 
25 Political When a conflict of interests arises between the 
wishes of the urban government and my own 
technical beliefs or the wishes of the political 
leaders of my personal community, I automatically 
and unquestionably follow the wishes of the 
government 
0       2 
26 Professional Elected officials rarely pressurise me to alter my 
personal expert decisions 
1      1 
27 Efficiency I see my role as to devise solutions that are 
technically feasible and efficient 
1      2 
28 Neutrality I believe that neutrality and impartiality should be 
the primary values within a bureaucracy 
2      3 
29 Neutrality My decisions are legitimate on the basis of my 0      0 
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technical expertise and by the fact that I provide 
technically feasible solutions 
30 Personal My role is to achieve the goals of the elected 
political representatives of my own community        
-3     -3 
31 Equity As I am involved in the policy making process, I 
ought to do so in a manner that advances the 
interests of those less well off in society, 
regardless of their background 




The best way to ensure efficient public service to 
the entire urban community is to facilitate the 
private sector in service provision 




I believe that citizens needs are best advanced 
through directly putting their needs first 
1      0 
34 Neutral I am reluctant to assume a leadership role in 
divisive policy issues. This is the prerogative of 
elected officials 
0      0 
35 Personal My decisions are legitimate as I represent the 
interests of my community 
-3    -3 
36 Professional I take the initiative in proposing policies, 
mobilising support for them, and questioning 
policies that may run counter to the general public 
interest 
2      1 
37 Neutral I know what is legal, not what is right. I stick to 
what is legal 




The best way to ensure efficient public service to 
the entire urban population is through public 
sector reform so that services may be provided 
equitably and efficiently by the public sector 
2      0 
39 Personal Given the recent history of the city, I can of course 
empathise with the needs of my community – My 
loyalty is to them and I work for their interests 
within the legal constraints of the bureaucracy 
-3     -2 
40 Professional When a conflict of interest arises between the 
wishes of the political level and my personal 
expert beliefs, I pursue my expert beliefs for as 
long as politically possible 
2      1 
41 Professional In my daily work I value the views of international 
and specialised organisations such as the IMF, 
World Bank, EU, OECD, policy specific think tanks 
and NGOs.  
2      0 
42 Political In my work I try to substitute my own political 
values with those of the political elite       
-2     1 
43 Personal My community pay taxes; it is my duty to 
represent them within the bureaucracy. Other 
bureaucrats advocate the allocation of resources 
for their communities, it is my duty to provide 
-3    -3 
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resources for my community 
44 Professional My loyalty is first and foremost with the policy 
area, then to my department 
0      1 
45 Personal Although it is rarely necessary, when needs be I do 
stand up for the rights and interests of my 
personal community 
-2     -2 
46 Personal I find it easier to relate to Councillors/Ministers 
from my own personal community. It is only logical 
– we share a common background 
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i
 The fieldwork for Bollens’ research was conducted shortly after the first IRA ceasefire in 1994 which 
ultimately paved the way for the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Power-sharing has been the mode of 
governance within Belfast City Council since 1997. In 2007 the Council adopted a ‘committee’ governance 
structure. 
ii
 In Radaelli and O’Connor (2009) European Council committee members were found not to adopt a common 
European identity but a common technocratic attachment – they shared an attachment to their professional 
associations be these attachments to the regulatory reform agenda or direct corporate taxation. Bureaucrats 
need not share opinions on the subject. Where they disagree, this disagreement is based on their own 
expertise, not national preferences.  
iii
 Of course some statements contain elements of two of these theoretically defined characteristics. 
Classifications are of course subjective. While the classification of the statement may be disputed, as 
statements are interpreted with reference to the position of all other statements, classification does not have 
a significant effect on findings. 
